

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/CODEWORD

INFORMATION

January 21, 1975

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: MORI/CDF C03207224

JAN M. LODAL

SUBJECT: Telemetry [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1
As Colby indicated at the Monday SALT VP meeting, he has sent you a memo (Tab A) on the telemetry [redacted] issue. [redacted]

25X1

NGA Review Completed.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/CODEWORD - XGDS

44-14256-3
317X

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

[redacted]
Copy 1 of 10

25X1

15 January 1975

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C.

25X1

Dear Henry:

In response to your request at the Verification Panel Meeting of 20 December, a talking paper is enclosed for your use in raising the subject of telemetry [redacted] with the Soviets. It may be given to them if you feel that it would further our case to do so.

25X1

25X1

Page Denied

Page Denied

25X1

Attachment to: [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

TALKING PAPER

I would like to discuss with you today a development which the US Government views with concern with regard to the future of strategic arms limitation.

[redacted] 25X1

Long ago, both sides agreed to the principle that arms limitation agreements are based upon the ability of each side to verify the compliance of the other. In the case of aggregate limits, it is necessary to ensure that neither party is exceeding the agreed aggregate limit or developing the capability to rapidly exceed it. For example, if one side were to develop a new intermediate range ballistic missile and deploy it widely, the other side would have

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

to assure itself that this system was not an ICBM and did not, in fact, have the capability to reach its territory.

Our two countries are also preparing to negotiate a limitation on the number of deployed MIRVed missiles, which presents special verification problems. In this case, each side must be able to assure itself that the flight test programs of the other side do not involve the development of new MIRV systems indistinguishable from those which do not carry MIRVs, and hence give rise to uncertainties in the number of MIRVed missiles which are deployed.

These considerations are of the greatest importance in fostering the kind of mutual trust required for any arms limitation agreement, especially one extending as far into the future as 1985.

In this connection, you should be aware that several years ago the United States had done much of the research and development work aimed at changing the data transmission technique used during the flight tests of our strategic missiles. The United States viewed such a program as contrary to the spirit of mutual trust embodied in the SAL agreements, and abandoned further development work on it soon after the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement were signed.

I believe that our two countries have an obligation to forego any activities which could foster an atmosphere of mistrust and thereby endanger enduring arms limitation. It is clear to me that it is in the best interest of the USSR, as well as of the US, that each side retain the capability to unambiguously identify the missile

SECRET

SECRET

flight test programs of the other. For this reason, I propose that our two countries agree to refrain henceforth from instrumentation practices of the type initiated by the Soviet Union in mid 1974.

SECRET